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DUALISM OR DUALITY?

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I

Do we live in an intrinsically rent and warring world? or is the schism only apparent, veiling a fundamental and all-pervasive harmony? or is the universe of such a nature as to admit of a conflict which, though it has sprung up within it, is not of it?

These three possibilities offer themselves to the mind that is trying to push through the world of appearances into the world of reality. The first is the conclusion of Dualism. The second is the conclusion of Monism. The third is an undifferentiated, but long prevalent and well-grounded, conviction, sometimes wrongly identified with dualism, sometimes with monism, but in reality independent of both. For want of a better term we may call it the principle of Duality.¹

If we look for exemplifications of the three attitudes, we readily find them, emphatically expressed, if not always clearly framed. Of the first the classic example is Zoroastrianism, with its close-drawn battle between good and evil, in which all forces, cosmic and human, are arrayed against each other. Here is apparently pure dualism; yet the further we press backward in Zoroastrianism the stronger does the emphasis become upon goodness both at the beginning and end of the cosmic process.²

Nevertheless, Zoroastrianism as a whole is an intense and uncompromising dualism, primarily moral, but becoming metaphysical as well as moral. Less assertive than this personal dualism, but sharing its inherent dualistic attitude, are all forms of imper-

¹ This is not a case of a distinction without a difference, but of a distinction without a terminology. I assume that the term Duality avoids the sense of disruption and hostility implied in the ending "ism."

² See G. F. Moore, "Zoroastrianism," *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. v, especially pp. 224, 225.

sonal dualism, which sets matter, as in itself evil or base, over against spirit, as opposed to it. Such are Buddhism, Essenism, Gnosticism, Manichaeism, certain forms of Neoplatonism, together with all the vagrant fanaticisms which despise the material life.

The second attitude, the interpretation of all existence as one, of spirit as only a form of nature, or nature as a form of spirit, is that of all thorough-going pantheisms and monisms, including Brahmanism, Spinozism, Hegelianism, absolute idealism in all its forms, cosmism, and physical monism. These may vary in character from the rapt intellectualism of Spinoza to the bald naturalism of Ostwald, but they agree in obliterating any fundamental difference between matter and mind, the natural and the spiritual, good and evil.

The third attitude consists in the recognition of two distinct and uninterchangeable but complementary forms of reality, conceived now as mind and matter, now as spirit and nature, the one active, the other passive;³ through whose right relation to one another, on the one hand, moral good is promoted, and through whose misrelationship, on the other hand, moral evil arises. Lying between the extremes of monism on the one side and dualism on the other, or perhaps beyond them both as their solvent and corrective, this theory of duality has had far more of influence and demands more of recognition than has been accorded to it.

The father and founder of this dual conception of the universe was Plato. Although Plato is universally called a dualist, strictly speaking the term is a misnomer. There is abundant material in the *Dialogues* to prove how far he was from dualism proper, both in its militant and its emanationistic forms. The non-dualistic attitude of Plato, as expressed in the *Timaeus*, for example, is evident in at least three particulars. First, he held a firm conception of the goodness of the world as a whole. "Why did the creator make the world? He was good and therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired that all things

³ Dualism proper regards the second principle as well as the first as active. The Stoics, like Plato, regarded matter as passive. "Das wahre Charaktermerkmal der $\delta\lambda\eta$ ist Passivität." Aal, *Geschichte der Logosidee*, p. 113.

should be as like himself as they could be.”⁴ Secondly, Plato provides no place either for an Angra-Mainyu or a demiurge. In the *Timaeus* he represents God as employing assisting gods in creating, but these, too, are God’s own creation.⁵ His only demiurge is Reason (*Noûs*). His universe is a rational universe, built upon the pattern of the eternal Ideas. Thirdly, Plato represents matter, or necessity, not as a hostile or evil principle but as the passive receptacle of the Ideas, and thus essential to creation. It is spoken of as “reluctant,” but yielding finally to the persuasions of reason.⁶ For the union of forms with the formless is needed to make a world. Whatever the connection between Platonism and Christianity, a duality not unlike this is the actual attitude toward the world which from the first Christianity adopted and maintained.⁷

II

Paul, the first and foremost representative interpreter of Christianity, defined the Christian attitude on this subject clearly and concisely in his well-known distinction between the natural and the spiritual man.⁸ There is no dualism here, simply duality. But it is a duality that is positive and significant. It contains in germ the entire attitude of Christianity toward life, theoretical and practical. For, as the apostle goes on to demonstrate, while there is no antagonism between nature and spirit, still the one is first and the other second, the one lower and the other higher. “Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.” In other words there is a difference in value, as well as in kind, between the natural and the spiritual. And in that difference lies the whole possibility and power of the new life—regeneration, self-development, resurrection. Here, too, lies the

⁴ Plato, *Timaeus*, 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁷ For a discussion of the dependence upon Plato of the Christian fathers in the Hexaemeroi see an article by Frank E. Robbins on “The Influence of Greek Philosophy in the Early Commentaries on Genesis,” in the *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1912.

⁸ 1 Cor. 15:44-49; also 1 Cor. 2:14.

possibility of that fatal schism between the inward man and the fleshly man (into whose members the law of sin has entered) described by the apostle in the seventh chapter of Romans. It is only as this dual constitution of the cosmos and of human nature enters into experience that the laws, the achievements, the hopes, of the Christian life are real and realizable.

Repeated attempts have been made to resolve Paul's duality into a metaphysical dualism. He does indeed (Gal. 5 17) make flesh and spirit hostile to one another, but never body and spirit. His "sins of the flesh" have been again and again misinterpreted as though they were sins arising from the flesh, instead of being, as he himself plainly indicates, sins connected with the flesh but arising from another source. In his enumeration of the works of the flesh, ten out of fifteen of those designated are mental rather than physical.⁹ His words concerning marriage have been misconstrued as dualistic. It is true that Paul expressed his preference for celibacy. But his advice against marriage is almost entirely upon grounds of expediency, and he distinctly pronounces marriage to be of divine appointment.¹⁰ Indeed, while he recognized the duality of nature and spirit, his whole attitude toward life and conduct is free, broad, and wholesome, based upon the principle that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof."¹¹

In this attitude there is every reason to believe that Paul had "the mind of Christ." He who was constantly throwing into antithesis the soul and the body, the earthly world and the heavenly, and who was the prince of the way of the cross, yet renounced the asceticism of John the Baptist and was called a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber. With this temper and spirit in its founder, communicating itself vitally to his followers, it would have been a complete subversion of the mind of its Lord for Christianity either to confound sense and spirit or to fall into a narrow and repressive asceticism.

The Christian church, though often crossing the border-line

⁹ Gal. 5 17-21.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 11 12.

¹¹ "There is no reason why Paul should not have been familiar with dualism as it existed in Hellenic thought; but that he embraced it or held it is a supposition obviously incompatible with the general tenour of his teaching." F. R. Tennant, *The Fall and Original Sin*, p. 269.

of dualism, on the whole avoided it. Victoriously lifting the spiritual above the material, insisting upon conversion from sin and a new birth into the spirit, inculcating self-denial and self-sacrifice, yet convinced that this is God's world from dust to star, thrusting away Gnosticism, Nicolaitanism, Manichaeism, Christianity remained for the most part clear-sighted and firm in sustaining a sane and balanced attitude toward life, exalting the world of the spirit, yet never cursing the world of sense. And for this steadfast spiritual sanity of the early church Paul, interpreting as he did the mind of Christ, was largely responsible.

The Johannine outlook upon the world is in essential agreement with that of Paul. The conception of the Logos which is the key to the Fourth Gospel involves duality and excludes metaphysical dualism. The fundamental distinction between reason and nature, form and matter, requires at once their differentiation from, and their adaptation to, each other. Creative activity on the part of reason, inherent receptivity on the part of matter—this is the heart of the doctrine of the Logos from Heraclitus through the Stoics and Philo to the present time. It is true that Neoplatonism developed a tendency, latent in Plato, to regard matter as essentially alien to reason, thus suggesting the agency of the Logos as that of intermediary between the two, but this is not the true and original conception of the Logos.¹² The divine Reason traverses no abyss of separation, according to true idealism, to reach its constructive material. It is its own creative expression. The author of the Fourth Gospel gives every indication of holding the true and not the debased conception of the Logos. The Word is from the beginning not only with God (*πρὸς τὸν θεόν*) but *of* God (*θεός*). All things are made through (*διά*) him. To crown all, he became flesh. The assertion is not that he assumed flesh but that he became flesh. This is essentially Philo's conception, except that this last intrepid assertion of incarnation completely transcends his purview. Philo's description of creation, far from assuming, as is commonly claimed, an original intractable and base matter, is true to the optimism of Genesis. For instance, in describing the first man he writes:

¹² It is to this prevalent but unjust notion of the doctrine of the Logos that its present disrepute is largely due.

And one may form a conjecture of the perfection of his bodily beauty from three considerations, the first of which is this: When the earth was now but lately formed by its separation from that abundant quantity of water called the sea, it happened that the materials out of which the things just created were formed were unmixed, uncorrupted, and pure; and the things made from this material were naturally free from all imperfection.¹³

Nature fresh and unsullied is not base but good. The spiritual seer who wrote the Fourth Gospel seems to have looked upon the nature of the world and of man in the same manner, as originally and of itself pure and good, a Logos-world, a Logos-lighted man. "Without him was not anything made that was made." It is only by virtue of an alien factor entering through a wilful desecration that the whole world order has become disturbed. When our author writes of the light shining in darkness and the darkness apprehending it not, it is of the self-produced darkness of the mind that he speaks. Out of this natural order, not because it is evil, but because it is unspiritual, one must be born anew. This involves a forsaking, not of the natural world itself, but of the sin that has come to darken it. In brief, in the Fourth Gospel, as in Paul, we find ourselves in the atmosphere of ontological duality and moral dualism. This attitude, thus early assumed, continued to characterize Christian theology.

III

Almost at the outset Christianity was exposed to the severest temptation to abandon this sane and simple duality for a profound and searching system of dualism, namely, Gnosticism. The full tide of this subtle and influential dualistic philosophy swept in upon Christianity, but left her unmoved. In gathering all her strength and summoning all her resources to resist Gnosticism, Christianity showed how thoroughly she was committed to a trustful and undivisive view of the world. She would neither yield nor compromise. In the agape and the *fides apostolica* are embodied the protest of the church against orientalism. Severe

¹³ De Opificio Mundi, § 47.

as the early church often was in her attitude toward the world, encouraging renunciation and self-denial, on the whole in her great battle with both Gnosticism and Docetism she stood firm for a good, undivisive universe.¹⁴

After this victory Christian theology enjoyed a period of inner serenity and freedom in which Platonism was thoroughly assimilated and christianized. The greatest of the apologists were Christian Platonists, and both they and the great Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, who followed them, maintained the Christian-Platonic dual conception of the universe, the key to which is the Logos incarnated in Jesus Christ. Athanasianism, too, turning, as it did, more directly to the problem of humanity, found the antinomy of flesh and spirit resolved in the divine-human Son of God.

Latin theology drifted toward metaphysical dualism, but stopped short of it, held back by the very genius and spirit of Christianity. Augustine's Neoplatonism led him at times to an immoderate disparagement of the world of sensation and a sombre overestimate of the welter of corruption in which humanity is sunk. And yet when he formulates, with deeper thoroughness of reflection, his theory of evil, he rests upon the principle *omne esse bonum est*, and makes the essence of evil to be negation.

The great ontological controversy of the Middle Ages, that between realism and nominalism, turned largely upon this same issue of redefining the relation of the eternal to the material, of the One to the many. Although Plato had made a place for both unity and diversity, he had thrown the balance of his emphasis so strongly upon the eternal and universal as to leave the material and individual in unjust subordination. Aristotle's correction of this maladjustment—which, however, threw the balance too heavily on the other side—did not find its way into theology until the mediaeval period. The great controversy of realism and nominalism was the result. Is the one reality that of universals? or is the chief reality that of individuals? With more of

¹⁴ "From the end of the second century it was for ever established in the church that the belief in an essential dualism of God and the world, spirit and nature, was irreconcilable with Christianity." Harnack, *Monasticism*, p. 23.

intuitive wisdom than of adherence to professional argumentative triumphs, mediaeval theology refused to accept either alternative, and held fast to a duality of reals, thus adding another testimony to the invincible duality of existence which from the first Christianity espoused. The distinction of a kingdom of nature and a kingdom of grace is another recognition of the fundamentally dual character of existence.

The Roman church, however, gradually yielded to a dualism stronger and more subtle than that of speculation—the ancient, obstinate dualism of superstition. Inconsistently, fatally, the church incorporated not only into its practice but into its theology the conception of a world alien to God, inhabited not only by corrupt men but by evil spirits, a world whose only hope lay in mediation and miracle, culminating in that incomparable concession to dualism, the perpetual miracle of the Mass. For, while the Mass is capable of interpretation in terms of the receptivity of the material elements to the divine spirit, as a matter of fact its remarkable hold has been due in large part to the assumed miracle of transformation by which that which in itself is common and undivine is made over by a wonder-working priesthood into the very body of Christ.

With the Reformation the bondage of this superstitious dualism was broken; and yet its fetters were not wholly cast aside. Luther, with a noble and enlightened faith, taught the wholesomeness of life, the sacredness of the family and of common toil; but side by side with this liberality he retained too strong a sense of the overshadowing power of a personal devil intrenched in the world itself. Calvin, with all his insistence upon a sovereignty of God that penetrated to every nook and corner of the earth and controlled every minutest act and event, managed to produce the effect of a practical metaphysical dualism, sadly distorting the joyousness of Christianity, wrapping its limbs in sackcloth and hampering its freedom with unnatural restrictions.

Yet on the whole Protestantism, while keenly alive, doctrinally and practically, to the moral dualism which has sprung up in the world, has never yielded to metaphysical dualism. It has thrown into the sharpest juxtaposition the goodness of creation

and the badness of man in abusing it. Still, its duality must be admitted to have been in the main an exaggerated and separative one, in which the immanence of the spiritual in the natural which characterized original Christianity and Greek theology has been almost wholly lost. Eighteenth-century rationalism represents the height of this hard, clear, cold separation of the two worlds. The arid poverty and frigid conventionality of this period prepared the way for the inrush of that tide of romanticism, pantheism, and orientalism which has carried us so far toward monistic and hedonistic attitudes.

Clearly and forcibly the truth has come home to our age that a hard-and-fast duality, which keeps the two realms of existence alien and apart, comes too near to a dualism that sets them against each other in implacable strife and hostility. Either monism or a duality of immanence in which the eternal finds its expression and embodiment in the natural—to one of these conclusions we seem to be moving. As to which of the two is the Christian attitude, there can be no doubt.

But has not Christianity, from the very first, and throughout its career to the present day, thrown into high relief the might and mystery of evil? Has it not spoken in tones of dread and warning of Satan and his angels, of principalities and powers, of wickedness in high places,¹⁵ as well as of besetting sins and thronging temptations? Yes; but always it has attributed this disruption and conflict to self-corrupted and rebellious wills. It has never made a place for it in the nature and design of Being itself. Its cosmology has been duality; its ethics, dualism. The struggle of the spirit is not so much a struggle with nature or matter as a struggle to be true to itself.

Into the remoter reaches of the problem why spirit should contain within itself the possibility of denying itself and subverting nature to unholy ends, Christian theology has never successfully entered. It has in the main been content to refer it to the root principle of freedom, which belongs to the very

¹⁵ Paul, who (together with the Johannine author) is as largely responsible for this conception of the superhuman character of evil as he is for the nondualistic sanity of the Christian attitude toward life, seems to have intended by these vigorous terms to emphasize the power of evil rather than to define it metaphysically.

essence of spirit, a principle which requires the possibility of evil but not at all its actuality. Thus Christian theology tends to leave the origin of moral evil in that unexplored realm in which the finite will works out its adjustment to the Infinite Will.

IV

Turning now to a brief survey of modern philosophy with reference to the distinction before us, we find that, as a matter of fact, practically all systems of modern thought have adopted in some form, as a working principle, the distinction between matter and mind. Spinoza himself, at the fountain-head of modern thought, did so. Descartes set the two in such sharp contrast as to win for the initial type of modern philosophy the title of dualism.¹⁶ But Cartesianism was not dualism in the proper sense, for it involved no necessary opposition between matter and mind, but simply their contrast. Descartes's description of the two has undergone radical reconstruction, yet the effort to resolve them into one seems as far from realization as ever. Static and mechanical as was Descartes's treatment of matter, his metaphysic was dual rather than dualistic.

Leibniz reduced matter to immateriality, but kept the distinction between body and soul by dividing his monads into ruling monads and subordinate monads. Here again is duality—though in a very attenuated form—without dualism. Still more tenuous is Berkeley's duality. Matter is but the sign-language of spirit. There are only minds and their ideas. But, even with material objects reduced to ideas, the inevitable distinction remains. There is something standing over against the mind, clothed in tangible and visible form—namely, its ideas. The fact that they can be used as food and clothing differentiates them from pure spirit.

With Kant the full recognition of ethical dualism comes into philosophy for the first time in its full strength, to interpret and accentuate metaphysical duality. Through Kant's insight that

¹⁶ Thus Martineau says: "With Descartes we enter upon the true era of metaphysical dualism." *Types of Ethical Theory*, i, 126.

the real source of true knowledge, as of true action, is the moral reason, philosophy entered into a new understanding of personality. Personalism thus found its true basis and setting only in Kant. He first saw, in their united meaning, the three principles of the necessity of an external world of some sort for the mind to reconstruct, the regulative action of the mind upon that world, and the supremacy of the moral reason over every other function of the mind. His unknowable *Ding an sich* was doubtless an awkward factor in his system, but it stood for his fundamental conviction of the duality of existence, so essential to ethics and to theology, and not even Fichte's searching criticism could make him disown it.

It is true, however, that Kant's duality was not only ill-adjusted but overdrawn. Both its rationalistic and agnostic elements produced extremes. The former led to the rationalistic idealism and ultimate monism of Hegelianism, the latter to the agnosticism and ultimate scepticism of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. Since the disintegration of absolutism and of agnosticism, philosophy, aside from its lapse into the philosophy of the unconscious in Germany and its adventure into the *cul de sac* of pragmatism in America, has been moving toward personal idealism, in which duality is interpreted in the light of social personality. The essential realities are persons. The external world exists, but only as the material for the development and communication of personalities. Eucken in Germany, Rashdall in England, and Howison in America, as representatives of this newer personal-social idealism, are doing much to steer us safely between the Scylla of monism and the Charybdis of pragmatism. Eucken's philosophy is notably clear in its recognition of the fact and significance of duality.¹⁷

Contrasted with this idealistic duality is that of Bergson, reached by the scientific-philosophical approach, yet equally positive in its assertion of the twofold nature of existence—matter and life—and in its rejection of metaphysical dualism. Bergson-

¹⁷ There can be no action, says Eucken, without this duality—keine Tat ohne Zweiheit—and the duality itself is indigenous to the action; it is both grounded within and overcome within it. Boyce Gibson, Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, p. 96.

ian matter, to be sure, though a "flux rather than a thing,"¹⁸ is relatively inert and irresponsible, and thus far like that of Plato and Plotinus, but never hostile or evil. It might seem that a flowing philosophy, such as that of Bergson, which recognizes nothing as static or determined, would be monistic, like the energetics of Ostwald; but such is not the case. His whole metaphysic is constructed upon the interaction of two opposite, yet not opposing, movements, matter on the one hand, life or consciousness on the other. "Matter, the reality which *descends*, endures only by its connection with that which *ascends*. But life and consciousness are this very ascension."¹⁹ This conception of matter gives it a distinct reality, and yet it only plays the part of foil, or rather protagonist, to consciousness. It is "a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive."²⁰ As such it stimulates consciousness to activity. "Above all, matter is what provokes effort and renders it possible."²¹ One of the most definitive as well as far-reaching statements which Professor Bergson has made appears in the same article from which the above sentence is quoted. It is to this effect: And I believe also that neither the matter constituting a world nor the consciousness which utilizes this matter can be explained by themselves, and that there is a common source of both this matter and this consciousness.²²

Here is both duality and also a strong suggestion of super-origin. Nevertheless, Bergson's duality, valuable as it is for both science and metaphysics, is tentative and incomplete. It fails to find the ultimate line of cleavage. The duality which is of chief concern for humanity is not that of life and matter, but that of nature and spirit. The personal and the physical—these are the two realms which together constitute the universe, the relations of which to each other form our imperative problem. Bergson's duality points toward this deeper duality, throws light upon it, but does not reach it.

Before going on to comment, in conclusion, upon the value of this conception of the dual nature of existence, we should pause

¹⁸ Creative Evolution, p. 186.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 369.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

²¹ "Life and Consciousness," Hibbert Journal, October, 1911, p. 41.

²² Ibid., p. 87.

to note an objection. It has doubtless occurred to the reader that in this study there has been a confounding of different kinds of dualities. That recognized by Christianity is not the same as that of philosophy, and science has its own form of duality, differing from both. And yet, though the lines shift and change, these are seen to be after all but aspects of one fundamental duality, that of the two realms—the realm of nature and the realm of ends.²³

V

In many ways the principle of duality throws light upon the problems both of nature and of man. A dual universe, for example, is the only one in which development and freedom are possible. Good as the universe is in origin and in essence, it is not as yet the best possible world, in the Leibnizian sense, since it has not reached its own best. It is not static, finished, but on the way. The best thing in it is that it is bettering, advancing, developing. Now the possibility of progress implies diversity of structure. A world strictly and absolutely homogeneous would be either a dead world or a perfect world. The world of the absolutist cannot truly develop. There is for it no higher and lower. The Hegelian process of development is only an unfolding, a coming to consciousness of the Perfect One, a passing from implicitness to explicitness. Nor can the world of naturalism develop, because it has nothing to develop toward. It can evolve, pass through cycles, as Spencer held, but true development is alien to the very idea of naturalism. Only a world in which there is a higher and a lower can develop. Development involves at least a duality of higher and lower.

A being of a dual nature, like man, must inevitably be confronted by the task of adjusting the one nature to the other. In proportion as he fails to keep the rational in control of the sensuous, he sins. The entire use of the senses and of the material world must be governed by spiritual laws, that is, by one's relation to other persons. Temptation comes, not through any sensuous appetite

²³ James Ward has strikingly set forth the contrast of these two realms in the first two chapters of his recent volume, *The Realm of Ends*.

in itself, but in yielding to it in contravention of personal obligations.

It is further evident that freedom is the essential condition of this process of adjustment, and that freedom carries with it the inevitable possibility of maladjustment. That this freedom is strictly confined to man alone is not so certain as it once seemed, now that Bergson and others have unfolded the realm of evolutionary choices and thus of a certain kind of nascent freedom in nature below man. In man, however, is the exercise of true freedom. In ourselves we are aware of nothing more real than the interplay of the dual part of our nature—the tug of our lower nature, which yet is not low, and the power of assertion and control of reason. Often this interplay rises into a strife, a “warfare” as Paul calls it, in which the natural man and the spiritual man make havoc of our peace of mind. And yet the enmity is not essential and inherent, for sometimes the two fall into such accord and harmony that life flows into a hymn of joy in which no jarring note is felt. Has not Browning the right of it when he sings:

Let us not always say,
“Spite of this flesh today
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!”
As the bird wings and sings,
Let us cry, “All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul!”

All nature-mysticism is built upon this deep accord of the outer and the inner, soul and sense, word and reason, beauty and truth,—an accord which has been disturbed but not broken. In our moments of finer insight, as in listening to music, we feel the harmony underlying all the discord of our life.

Clearly, then, the schism lies in a disturbance and not in an inherent disharmony of the two elements of our being. “The world is of the right stuff, but of wrong arrangement.”²⁴ The duality is as capable of harmony as of strife. It has become a dualism only through the corrupting act of will. Clearly, too, the dualism is not confined to the individual will simply, but is

²⁴ G. M. Stratton, *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 355.

a social as well as an individual schism. Whether this dissension is confined to human wills or embraces a wider circle, including mightier spirits, is a matter of conjecture only. It does not affect the principle; namely, that moral dualism is due to defective will and is not original and essential.

VI

It is not easy to realize the full significance and value of this uno-dual *Weltanschauung*, with the attitude of mingled confidence and watchfulness that it begets. It presents to us a world consisting of two mutually fulfilling forms of existence, which we call matter and mind, or sense and spirit, the one formative, the other receptive; the one non-spatial, the other spatial; the one subjective, the other objective; the one purposive, the other non-purposive. It is not a divided world, for these two forms of existence are neither hostile nor unrelated; indeed Christianity assigns them to a single Creative Source. It is, in fact, a consistent world, a *good* world. It is a good world in virtue of the fact that reason is dominant in it. There is in it no inherent conflict of light and darkness, no battle of gods and giants, heat and cold, Yang and Yin, no perpetual strife of angels and demons. And yet there is a real battle—*within the human soul*.

In the recognition of this schism which has entered into the world through human sin it is undoubtedly true that there has been a strong tendency on the part of those who hold the dual attitude to carry the disruption back toward the very centre and source of things and thus approach the dualistic attitude. For this reason they often appear to be thorough-going dualists. This is the case, in some degree, with Plato, with Paul, with Philo, with Plotinus, with Origen, notably so with Augustine; and from Augustine the tendency communicated itself to Protestantism. Disparagement of the body, asceticism, hostility to art and to culture, other-worldliness, have been the unhappy results. But this exaggerated duality, which has carried it, at times, to the very verge of dualism, has been in the interest of the life of the spirit in the ardent endeavor to throw the emphasis where it

rightly belongs. In the attempt to adjudicate values the adjustment of values has suffered. Yet, after all, this is a pardonable error, however disastrous, since committed in behalf of the higher life, the greater value.

Present-day thought and life, in its swing toward monism and hedonism, its overvaluation of material good, and its loss of the mystical element in religion, is in need of a restored recognition of the distinction between spirit and nature and of the inherent supremacy of spirit. It is only thus that life can be made normal, and humanity move toward the goal of the personal and social ideal. Unless the eternal transcendence of spirit over nature is kept in view, nature is certain to absorb and suppress all sense of the spirit. Unless, on the other hand, the immanence of spirit in nature is recognized, nature can never fulfil her highest uses and noblest ends. We have advanced from the separative duality of Plato and of the repressive type of Christian theology to the conception of a duality of immanence which is the heart of Christianity. Is it to be lost in a resurgence of monism or of naturalism?

There is no reason whatever why we should be forced into the alternative, monism or dualism. It is a factitious dilemma. There has always been a third point of view, more prevalent, more fundamental, more vital than either of these, obscured by its superficial resemblance to metaphysical dualism, yet now, through the light shed upon it by personalism, growing constantly clearer and more emancipating. Inconsistent with monism and with dualism, it is yet entirely consistent with a Unity that grounds in Theism and a Pluralism that centres in Personalism.